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Abstract
The expression “analytic narratives” is used to refer to a range of quite recent
studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and econom-
ics. These studies purport to explain speciﬁc historical events by combining the
usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and
political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory,
especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these
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tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical choice. The chapter
explains what analytic narratives are by reviewing the studies of the major book
Analytic Narratives (Bates et al., 1998), which are concerned with the workings
of political institutions broadly speaking, as well as several cases drawn from
military and security studies, which form an independent source of the analytic
narratives literature. At the same time as it gradually develops a deﬁnition of
analytic narratives, the chapter investigates how they fulﬁl one of their main
purposes, which is to provide explanations of a better standing than those of
traditional history. An important principle that will emerge in the course of the
discussion is that narration is called upon not only to provide facts and problems
but also to contribute to the explanation itself. The chapter distinguishes between
several expository schemes of analytic narratives according to the way they
implement this principle. From all the arguments developed here, it seems clear
that the current applications of analytic narratives do not exhaust their potential,
and in particular that they deserve the attention of economic historians, if only
because they are concerned with microeconomic interactions that are not cur-
rently their focus of attention.
Keywords
Analytic narratives · Game theory · Rational choice theory · Historical
explanation · Narratives versus models · Case study method · Equilibrium
analysis of institutions · Deterrence theory · Political economy · Security studies
Introduction
The expression “analytic narratives” refers to studies that are located at the academic
boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport
to explain speciﬁc historical states of affairs by combining the usual narrative
approach of historians with the analytic approach that is familiar to economists
and political scientists. Being speciﬁc, and indeed often highly speciﬁc, the historical
situations, events, or actions they cover rarely overlap from one study to another. If
there is any unity to analytic narratives, it does not lie in the objects but in the method
of explanation, and from this angle, they have two broad principles in common. The
ﬁrst is that analytic narratives jointly exploit the resources of narration and analysis,
the presumption being that this can result in better solutions to explanatory problems
than if either technique were used in isolation. The second principle is that the
analytic component is drawn from the theories of rational decision-making, prom-
inent among which is game theory; the presumption here is that the tools they offer
do ﬁt the purpose of combining narration and analysis. More needs to be said to
characterize analytic narratives, but these two principles are part and parcel of their
deﬁnition.
Both principles come out most clearly in Analytic Narratives (Bates et al. 1998),
an important collective book that popularized the expression and provided the
approach with a manifesto as well as illustrative case studies. These studies belong
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to the historical branch of political science, and to get the full range of the genre, one
must turn to the historical parts of those other ﬁelds – to wit, military studies, security
studies, and international relations (IR) studies – in which analytic narratives have
also undergone autonomous development. Proximate forms of analytic narratives
had circulated there before the eponymous book came out. Besides giving retro-
spective structure to these signiﬁcant, albeit unconscious, past attempts, Analytic
Narratives pursues a speciﬁc program on political institutions, which it proposes to
reconstruct as equilibria of individual interactions, these generally being modeled by
game theory. The chapter is concerned with the connections between analytic
narratives and history, and although it will mention this connection with theoretical
political science, this will not be developed here.
We will explain what analytic narratives (AN) are by surveying, ﬁrst, the ﬁve
cases in the eponymous book and then ﬁve further cases drawn from military and
security studies, to which we append a case that is again borrowed from political
history but uses the same techniques as those in the latter group. In general, we
follow a bottom-up approach, ﬁrst summarizing the cases, and then attempting to
capture their methodological features. As we journey along this inductive road, we
will identify a third guiding principle of AN, which is less transparent than the ﬁrst
two, to the effect that the narrative component does not simply provide the data
against which explanatory hypotheses are to be tested, but also contributes to the
explanation as such. The chapter takes the third principle to be deﬁnitional, just like
the ﬁrst two, which amounts to deﬁning AN more precisely than is usually done.
The emphasis on the third principle, and the upgrading of the narrative compo-
nent more generally, is common to this chapter and other accounts by the same
author, where this component receives even more emphasis. Along the same line of
analysis, we will draw an internal distinction between different forms of AN. The
crucial observation here is that some AN give the ﬁnal explanatory word to a
narrative, while others state their explanatory conclusions in theoretical language.
Thus, although we regard it as being deﬁnitional, we take the third principle to be
implementable in quite different ways from one AN to another.
Besides providing a deﬁnition, the chapter assesses the extent to which AN
contribute to historical explanation. For this, we use the scheme of deductive
explanation, which Hempel (1965) and other philosophers of science proposed to
clarify the structure of scientiﬁc explanation. This scheme is popular among some
AN contributors: however, we will argue that the AN themselves conform only very
roughly and imperfectly to it. Here, however, the discovery of deductive failures in
the explanatory arguments functions as a positive feature, as it prepares us for the
claim that the narrative component of AN complements deduction in structuring
their explanations. This is how the chapter connects its two topics, i.e., the deﬁnition
of AN and the account of their explanatory capacity.
The chapter develops as follows. Section “The Five Studies of Analytic Narra-
tives” summarizes the work by Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, andWeingast collected
in Analytic Narratives. Section “Some Deﬁning Characteristics of Analytic Narra-
tives” exploits this material to make some progress with the deﬁnition of AN. In
particular, it argues that AN should involve proper formalism, but that this formalism
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does not have to be limited to the game theory employed in the book. This section
merely makes explicit what the authors themselves suggest. Section “Analytic
Narratives from Military and Security Studies” extends the sample with two military
studies by Haywood and Mongin, a group of studies on the Cuban crisis, which are
included here only to facilitate comparison, several security studies by Zagare
(in particular taken from his 2011 reference book The Games of July), and a study
of post-communist political transitions by Nalepa. Section “Analytic Narratives and
Deductive Explanation” discusses how AN contribute to historical explanation, by
reference to the deductive scheme of scientiﬁc explanation. Section “The Role of
Narration in Analytic Narratives” deals with the narrative element of AN, arguing
that it can make up for some of the failures of the deductive scheme that the previous
section pointed out. This concludes our assessment of the contribution AN make to
historical explanation, at the same time as establishing our proposed deﬁnition for
this genre. The section also sets out a taxonomy of AN based on the way narratives
enter the exposition, the three categories being alternation (of the narrative with the
model), local complementation (of the narrative by the model), and analyzed
narratives (in which the model and the narrative are merely juxtaposed).
Section “Conclusion” brieﬂy takes stock suggesting that AN may be a tool for
economic history.
The Five Studies of Analytic Narratives
Here we simply review the ﬁve case studies presented in Analytic Narratives,
following the chronological order adopted in that book. The next section will use
this major sample to introduce a general discussion of AN.
Case 1 Middle-Ages Genoa (Greif) In the Middle Ages, the city-state of Genoa
was ﬁrst governed by elected consuls (1096–1194) and then by an appointed
magistrate, the podestà, who was chosen from outside the city (1194–1334).
Under the consulate, civil peace prevailed from 1096 to 1164 (period I), and then
there was civil war lasting from 1164 to 1194 (period II). Under the podesteria, civil
peace prevailed throughout (period III). Genoa’s main economic activity was long-
distance trade in the Mediterranean, and this activity was prosperous concomitantly
with civil peace, i.e., for periods I and III, but with a noticeable peak at the end of the
former. The main actors of economic and political life were the clans, which appear
to have kept their identity and relative inﬂuence ﬁxed for much of the period under
study. In view of this fact, the time sequence emerges as problematic. Why did the
clans ﬁrst cooperate and then ﬁght under the politically unchanged conditions of the
consulate? Why did they cooperate most efﬁciently at the end of the ﬁrst period of
civil peace? How did the institutional move to the podesteria contribute to
reestablishing the civil peace that prevailed henceforth and why did it occur when
it did? These are Greif’s main explanatory questions. He notes that the historians’
work fails to answer them satisfactorily, or even to raise them in full clarity.
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Greif responds by constructing two classes of extensive form games of perfect
information. He then investigates their subgame perfect equilibria, as is classically
done for such games.1 The ﬁrst class, which relates to the consulate regime, has two
games, both of which involve the clans as players; the difference between them
hinges on whether the number of maritime possessions of Genoa is taken to be
exogenous or endogenous. We will report only on the simpler of the two, which is
the game with an exogenous number of possessions.2 This game explains the
changes from period I to II by using the external threat posed by the German
Emperor as a variable parameter. Depending on whether the threat is absent or
present, Greif retains a different subgame perfect equilibrium – here relabelled as
mutual deterrence equilibrium (MDE). The presence of this threat pushes the clans
towardsmutually advantageousMDE by the following mechanism. In general, clans
compete to gain control over the consulate, which would guarantee them a higher
share of trade beneﬁts, and this competition stabilizes peacefully only because they
spend on deterrence resources they could more proﬁtably spend on joint trade; this is
what MDE formally captures. Now, the controlling clan also incurs the burden of
external wars when they happen, so that the external threat changes the clans’ ex ante
net beneﬁts of conquering the consulate; this is why MDE with fewer resources
spent on deterrence, and more on joint trade, arise when there is such a threat. The
chapter presents his ﬁrst class of games only informally; a full treatment appears in
Greif (2006, Chap. 8).
The second class has a single game, which is intended for period III and has the
podestà as a third player. Among others, it captures a clan’s two strategic possibil-
ities of accepting the podestà’s authority or attempting to take control of Genoa, at
the risk of starting a war against the podestà and the other clans. For relevant
parametric conditions, this game has a subgame perfect equilibrium that explains
the stabilizing effect of the podesteria. At this equilibrium, clan 1 (which makes the
ﬁrst move) abstains from challenging clan 2; clan 2 (which reacts to clan 1’s move)
ﬁghts if challenged; and the podestà (who reacts to the two clans’ moves) joins
forces with clan 2 against clan 1 in case of a ﬁght, but colludes with clan 1 otherwise.
That the podestà can possibly collude with clan 1 motivates clan 2 to ﬁght, and that
the podestà can possibly support a ﬁghting clan 2 motivates clan 1 not to challenge
in the ﬁrst place. As entailed by subgame perfect equilibrium, these two threats are
credible. The parameters on which the existence of this equilibrium depends are the
players’ probabilities of victory and defeat and the accompanying payoffs. Most
important are the parameter values for the podestà since they ought to match his
1For the game theory discussed in this chapter, see the texts by Morrow (1994) and Harrington
(2009), and at a more advanced level, by Myerson (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
2Only the second game makes it possible to investigate the clans’ trade-off between ﬁghting a civil
war to gain control of Genoa and peacefully collaborating to get more maritime possessions.
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reward scheme and military means, as described by historians. Greif’s chapter
presents the podesteria model in complete detail (see also Greif 2006, Chap. 8).3
Case 2 Ancien Régime Finances (Rosenthal) A classic historical problem con-
cerns understanding why the pace of institutional change differed between France
and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with one country keeping
the absolutist monarchy until its ﬁnal disruption, while the other moved gradually
towards representative government. Rosenthal reconsiders the problem in the light
of the two countries’ difference in ﬁscal structure. Given that the product of taxes
was mostly spent on wars, this leads him to raise another question, i.e., how a
country’s style of warfare relates to its political regime.
The examination is carried out in terms of an informally stated model that an
appendix makes formal. There are two actors, the King and the elite (an abstraction
representing the parliaments in France and England, and the provincial estates in
France, where they existed), who enjoy separate ﬁscal resources and try to make the
best of them in ﬁghting proﬁtable wars. By assumption, the King alone has the
power to launch a war, and if he exerts it the elite decides whether or not to
participate ﬁnancially. Since most wars need joint funding, there is a free rider
problem, which, the model shows, is more acute when the ﬁscal resources are shared
between the King and the elite than when they are in one player’s hands. This
translates into the prediction that wars are more frequent, the higher the King’s share
of ﬁscal resources. For Rosenthal, France’s absolutism was a case of sharing,
whereas England’s representative government was one of near control by the elite.
Hence, he has a rough prediction to test on the two countries and can address the
issue of how their warfare relates to their regimes. His model also implies the correct
prediction that the overall level of taxation was higher in England than in France.
However, it is unclear how it addresses the initial question of the different pace of
political change in the two countries.
Case 3 19th Century Conscription (Levi) In the nineteenth century, several
Western states changed their regulations of military service, moving from conscrip-
tion with provisions for buying out of the duty to more or less universal conscription.
Historians have usually emphasized democratization and military efﬁciency as
being the two likely reasons for this. However, the latter is technically doubtful
(a professional army would have dominated all other arrangements), and the former
is objectionable in view of the timing of reforms (they indifferently took place either
before or after universal suffrage prevailed). Starting from these objections, Levi
compares the changes in France, the United States, and Prussia, paying attention not
only to the chronological pattern but also to the variable pattern of buying out (there
3Critics of Greif’s approach to the podesteria have complained that this institution originated in a
decision made by the German Emperor, not by the Genoese. See, however, fn 5.
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were three distinctive forms, i.e., substitution, replacement, commutation). She does
not mean to displace the previous explanations entirely, but rather to subsume them
under her own.
To do so, Levi develops an informal analysis in the spirit of formal political
economy, whereby three main actors contribute to shape national decisions on the
conscription regime. They are the army, which wants only military efﬁciency; the
government, which balances it against social and economic considerations, such as
employing the population efﬁciently; and the legislature, which aligns itself with the
coalition among three social groups (traditional elites, middle class, and workers)
that make up the constituent body. With this construction at hand, the pattern of
reform in each country can be explained by hypothesizing changes in the actors’
motivations. Levi proposes two such changes, i.e., the increased demand from army
and government for troops and the legislature’s evolving preferences, both of which
push in the direction of universal conscription. She relates the latter change to a
reshufﬂe within the politically inﬂuential coalition (the pivotal middle class turning
away from the traditional elites and becoming allied with the workers), as well as to
an increased taste for equality among the social groups. The two main hypotheses
from the historical literature appear again, though included within a systematic
explanation scheme. The study draws on Levi’s (1997) thorough antecedent work
on the same topic and thus includes rich historical evidence.
Case 4 Antebellum Federation (Weingast) Historians of the United States have
long been puzzled by the relative stability of the federation through the decades that
preceded the Civil War. Classically, they argue that slavery was at ﬁrst not as divisive
an issue as it would become, and that the Democratic Party after Jackson success-
fully managed a coalition of southern and northern interests. Others have empha-
sized the role of local political issues and changing economic conditions. Weingast
includes these factors in a narrative that stresses explicit political arrangements,
especially the following rule of balance: slave states should remain equal in number
with free states, so as to provide the South with a veto power in the Senate. The
narrative records the crises that the Union underwent each time the admission of a
new state threatened the balance. The ﬁrst crisis led to the emergence of the
compromise rule, which helped resolve the second, but did not work with the
third. This ultimate failure depended on an admixture of economics and politics:
to keep an effective balance despite the continuing expansion to the West, the slave
economy would have had to develop beyond its feasible limits.
Weingast includes three formal models in his narrative, the ﬁrst of which is of the
spatial brand of voting theory. This model aims at weighing the political inﬂuences
on the politics of the Union of the agrarian South, commercial Northeast, and
intermediate Northwest, respectively. When these three actors differ only on the
economic dimension, the Northwest acts as an electoral pivot, and the Union as
a whole inclines in the direction of agrarianism, because the Northwest is closer to
the South than the Northeast on this particular dimension. However, if slavery enters
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the political debate, the last part of conclusion does not necessarily hold because the
pivotal Northwest is closer to the Northeast than the South on that dimension. The
spatial model makes it possible to clarify coalitional possibilities when the political
debate is so enlarged. Following a related treatment, Riker (1982) had famously
claimed that it was to some Northeast politicians’ advantage to introduce slavery on
the electoral agenda, and it became a political issue after 1830 precisely for that
reason (the so-called Riker thesis). The other two models used in Weingast’s study
are extensive form games of a straightforward sort. Comparison of their subgame
perfect equilibria shows that giving the South a veto power has the effect of blocking
the compromise between the Northeast and the Northwest that would otherwise
prevail. This reinforces the general point that the rule of balance was an important
component of federal stability in antebellum America.4
Case 5 ICO (Bates) From 1962 to 1989, the International Coffee Organization
(ICO) regulated the international prices of coffee by setting quotas on the exports of
its members, notably Brazil and Colombia, which were the main producers. Bates
accounts for the birth, regular functioning, and ﬁnal collapse of this institution. This
involves him using, or at least mentioning, various game-theoretic tools, but the
study nonetheless follows a classic narrative structure, with a beginning, an end, and
intervening steps that exactly reproduce the objective sequence. While the other
studies state their explanatory problems in advance and subject their narrative parts
to the solution of these problems, this one lets its explanatory puzzles and answers
emerge as the story unfolds.
The birth of the ICO raises one such explanatory puzzle. As early as the 1950s,
Brazil and Colombia had a cartel policy of restricting quantities and boosting prices,
and tried to attract other coffee producers to this policy. However, it is only at the
beginning of the 1960s that they succeeded in doing so and thus became able to
establish the ICO. Bates explains why success was delayed by arguing that the
proximate cause of its establishment was that the United States became favorable to
the cartel policy. This is a paradoxical answer because the United States was on the
consumption not the production side. Bates makes this answer plausible by relating
how Brazil and Colombia, having failed in their ﬁrst attempt, turned to the US State
Department brandishing the communist threat and the long-term advantages of a
4Perhaps because its topic has been heavily researched, Weingast’s study seems to have aroused
special attention from readers of Analytic Narratives. Some have complained that it is not clear
whether the rule of balance in the Senate was central to the stability of the Federation, and
accordingly how much its collapse contributed to the civil war. A quick answer may be that the
study selects one particular sequence of actions and events for investigation, and this provides a
partial but real explanatory argument (which incidentally comes out most clearly at the post-
modeling narrative stage, see section “The Role of Narration in Analytic Narratives”).
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cartel organization, and eventually met with success when some large US coffee-
selling companies decided to support their lobbying. Each of these small narrative
segments is followed by an allusive formal argument that clariﬁes the strategic
situation.
Some Defining Characteristics of Analytic Narratives
The ﬁve studies of Analytic Narratives have a common focus on institutions, and
more precisely on institutions that either belong to the internal state organization
(Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4) or indirectly depend on it (Case 5, which deals with interna-
tional relations). They also embody a common approach to the understanding of
institutions. The key idea is that institutions operate not only through the formal rules
that overtly deﬁne them but also through implicit rules of behavior that guarantee
their function given the way participating agents respond to them. As an example,
the podesteria can be viewed either by considering the ofﬁcial terms of employment
of the podestà, or, more relevantly for an explanatory purpose, as a system of mutual
threats between the clans and the podestà that made it possible for the latter to fulﬁl
his role effectively. This heuristic is implemented by representing institutions in
terms of equilibria of interactive processes, and it is at this juncture that game theory
comes into play. Thus, Greif devises a game in which the existence of an equilibrium
demonstrates that mutual threats can credibly balance each other, which secures
compliance of the clans with the podesteria institution.
Conceptualizing institutions, and more speciﬁcally political institutions, as equi-
libria of interactive processes, whether by game-theoretic or other means, is a
signiﬁcant contribution to the neo-institutionalist school of thought. Elsewhere,
Greif (2006, Chap. 1) clariﬁes the differences between this “self-enforcement”
conception and those of previous neo-institutionalists. These writers had already
discussed institutions from the perspective of the agents’ interests, but in a somewhat
more naïve fashion, often simply assuming that institutions are imposed “top-down”
on the agents (what Greif calls the “institutions as rules” conception).5 Two other
major differences, even with historically oriented neo-institutionalists such as North
(1981, 1990), have to do with the method of case studies adopted in Analytic
Narratives and the speciﬁc attention this work pays to the role of narratives.
More crucially for our purposes, the ﬁve studies illustrate the two principles stated
at the opening of this chapter. Each exhibits a collaboration between narrative
writing and the employment of analytic tools, and each borrows these tools from
the theories of rational decision-making. In the rest of this section, we expand on the
second principle, using the studies as reference material. We defer an examination of
5An answer to the objection echoed in fn 3 is forthcoming along this line. The podesteria may well
have been imposed “top-down” upon the Genoese from the outside, yet the question arises
nonetheless of why they made its functioning possible, a question that the “institutions as rules”
conception addresses. Clark’s (2007) otherwise critical account of Greif (2006) clearly
recognizes this.
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the ﬁrst principle to section “The Role of Narration in Analytic Narratives,” where
the third principle will also be considered.6
Formal models of varying precision and sophistication occur in Cases 1, 2, 4, and
5, though not in Case 3. One may thus wonder whether or not AN in general must
involve a formalism. As for the studies that do employ one, they primarily rely on
extensive form games of complete information, and one may thus wonder how much
this choice of models matters to AN. This section answers these two questions by
arguing that (i) AN do require formal models and (ii) AN can borrow these models
from any formal branch of the theories of rational decision-making. These two
answers spell out what the ﬁve authors have only suggested (in Analytic Narratives)
or brieﬂy stated (in their informative rejoinders to critics; see Bates et al. 2000a, b).
Thus, they acknowledge that their “restriction of models to extensive form games
limits the range of issues [they] address” (2000b, p. 691), and they endorse “the
requirement of a formal model” (p. 693). This amounts to making claims (i) and (ii).
One argument for restriction (i) is that ignoring it would take the edge off the AN
methodology. Historians already borrow from common-sense ideas on individual
rationality to confer explanatory value on their narratives. But they rarely make these
ideas explicit, and this may be for two reasons: they may regard them as being too
banal to be stated, or they may consider that a fuller statement would break the
narrative ﬂow. As they are not subject to the same discursive constraints as ordinary
narratives, AN can unfold the terse suggestions contained in the latter and thus
attempt to enhance their explanatory value. To do that, AN bring in specialized
concepts of individual rationality: but if they eschew formalization of these concepts,
they may be hardly different from the scholarly expansions that historians append to
ordinary narratives in the introductions, conclusions, and appendices of their works.
Interestingly, when revisiting Analytic Narratives, Levi (2002, p. 109) claims that
the essays in this book “do not represent a breakthrough”. It seems more fruitful,
however, to allow that they do introduce something new – for better or worse. With
(i) included in their deﬁnition, AN create an unusual tension between the narrative
and the formal modeling. How this tension can be managed is the most exciting
problem AN raise for the methodologically minded social scientist.7
There is actually a more direct reason for supporting restriction (i). The AN
methodology crucially relies on the concept of equilibrium, understood one way or
6Analytic Narratives has given rise to a rather large number of discussions, which space reasons
prevent us from covering here. The reader may in particular consult American Political Science
Review, 94, 2000, no 3, and Social Science History, 24, 2000, no 4, which contain one or more
reviews followed by a rejoinder from the ﬁve authors. Some of these discussions express strong
scepticism about either the individual contributions or the methodological project itself; among the
reasons for this scepticism is the routine complaint that “rational choice theory” (whether formal or
not) is either ﬂawed or inapplicable. None of these discussions – even the favorable ones – properly
recognizes the special function that narratives, as against other forms of reporting of historical
events, fulﬁl in the AN methodology.
7One of the ﬁrst works to explore this tension is the collection by Grenier et al. (2001); it does not
yet refer to AN.
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another, and the full development of this concept plainly requires a formalism. Levi
rightly observes that Analytic Narratives makes extensive use of comparisons of
equilibria: “the emphasis is on identifying the reasons for the shift from an institu-
tional equilibrium at one point in time to a different institutional equilibrium at a
different point in time” (2002, p. 111). This is the method of comparative statics,
which economists implemented and made famous before passing it on to other social
scientists. However, the method will remain at a heuristic level as long as one does
not select a formal theory – e.g., that of extensive form games of complete informa-
tion – and specify a model within that theory – e.g., by ﬁxing a set of players, a set of
strategies and preference orderings that fully deﬁne the game to be studied. The
comparative statics exercise, which is quantitative by essence, is possible only if
some of the data of the modeling stage – e.g., the preference data of the game – are
stated parametrically, with a range of numerical values set for each parameter. The
exercise then consists in deducing how the equilibria change as a consequence of the
parameters varying within their ranges. Even more clearly than in Analytic Narra-
tives, this will be illustrated in Zagare’s (2011) The Games of July (see Cases 9 and
10 in next section).8
Having defended restriction (i), we move to the generalization proposed in (ii). A
common thread between Cases 1, 2, 4, and 5 is their reliance on non-cooperative
games of extensive form. In their introductory manifesto, the authors defend this
particular form on the ground that they focus on “sequences of actions, decisions,
and responses that generate events and outcomes” (Bates et al. 1998, p. 9; see also
Levi 2002, p. 111). The implicit claim is that the sequence of moves in the game is
capable of paralleling a concrete sequence of actions and reactions by historical
actors. One may, however, doubt that such nice parallelism really takes place.
Consider the podesteria game; it involves moves such as “to challenge,” “to
ﬁght,” “to prevent,” which can hardly represent genuine actions by the clans or the
podestà. If the moves are idealizations, their sequential ordering cannot represent the
passing of historical time; and indeed, if the podestà plays last rather than ﬁrst in the
game, this is for theoretical convenience, not descriptive accuracy. Of course, this
semantic observation does not entail that extensive form games are unimportant to
AN but only that this genre has no privileged association with them. Cases 6 and 7 in
the next section will show that games in normal form can be equally relevant. On a
different note, Cases 1, 2, 3, and 5 share a limitation by only considering extensive
form games of perfect information (or possibly extensions of these to exogenous
uncertainty). This conveniently guarantees that solutions to the games can be found
by backward induction, as the subgame perfect equilibrium requires in this case. As
next section will also show (Cases 9, 10, and 11), AN can support the more
sophisticated formalism of extensive form games of incomplete, hence also
8In this paragraph, we imply the familiar conception of a model as a construct mediating between
theories and real objects. The alternative conceptions canvassed in recent philosophy of science
could also be brought into relation to AN.
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imperfect information, along with the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, which
is commonly used to solve these games.9
AN can be developed in other technical directions than noncooperative game
theory. Cooperative game theory may provide appropriate models when it comes to
analyzing the formation of coalitions, as in the ICO case.10 Furthermore, not every
historical state of affairs that involves multiple individuals calls for a game-theoretic
analysis: individual decision theory, whether of the expected utility form or others,
may be sufﬁcient for the modeling purpose. This is the case by deﬁnition when the
multiple individuals face natural uncertainty, but also and more subtly when social
uncertainty can acceptably be represented as if it were natural. When commenting
on Clausewitz’s military narratives, Mongin (2009) argues that some of his judg-
ments can plausibly be reconstructed as expected utility comparisons; this is so
despite the fact that the situations are strategic in an intuitive sense. There seems to
be no rule to determine when game theory is indispensable to the analysis of
interaction and when it is not. It is useful to register this indeterminacy, and then
avoid restricting the technical apparatus of AN beforehand.11
Analytic Narratives from Military and Security Studies
While the previous AN belong to the historical part of political science, those
covered in this section mostly belong to the historical parts of military studies
(Cases 6 and 7) and security studies (Cases 8, 9, and 10). We distinguish between
the last two ﬁelds as follows: military studies is concerned with actual war actions –
battles, campaigns, guerillas, information wars, and the like – and security studies
with actions taken under the shadow of war, i.e., facing the possibility of wars that
may or may not break out. As two game-theoretic contributors to security studies
write, “the games we analyze are not war games as such, but the choice that players
make may precipitate conﬂict that leads to war” (Brams and Kilgour 1988, p. 3).
This basic distinction is sometimes overlooked, which is unfortunate because mil-
itary and security studies have different conceptual orientations.12
Case 6 World War II Battles (Haywood 1954) Shortly after World War II,
Haywood, then a colonel in the US Air Force, discovered von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s (1944) work and made the ﬁrst ever application of game theory to
9On the logical relation between the concepts of perfect information and complete information, see
the texts by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Harrington (2009), Myerson (1991) and Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994). The ﬁrst text in this list is the locus classicus for the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium concept.
10Bates suggests considering the Shapley value for this purpose. For this and other concepts of
cooperative game theory, see Myerson (1991) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
11Schiemann (2007) promotes a further extension of AN to behavioral economics and illustrates this
by a study of an event from the Yugoslav civil wars in the 1990s.
12See Betts (1997) for a more thorough discussion that includes a history of security studies.
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war events, publishing a sketch in Haywood (1950) and a detailed version in
Haywood (1954). For this application, he selected a 1943 naval battle in the Paciﬁc
War and a strategic turning point in the 1944 Normandy campaign. His main concern
was to connect the US military doctrine of decision, which was prescriptive, with
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Min-Max solution for 2-person zero-sum games,
which he also regarded as being prescriptive. He argued that the military doctrine of
decision was right in prescribing ofﬁcers to act on an estimate of the enemies’
capabilities, not on a guess of their intentions – the argument being that if the
game has no Min-Max solution in pure strategies, guessing intentions leads to an
inﬁnite regress of strategic calculations. Despite this prescriptive orientation,
Haywood’s inquiry has some bearing on historical explanation.13
In the Bismarck Sea battle of February 1943, the US Air Forces destroyed a naval
Japanese convoy that was sailing from Rabaul on New Britain Island to Lae on the
New Guinea coast. Of the two possible routes, north of New Britain and south of it,
the Japanese commander had chosen the former. Unaware of this, the US general in
charge had to choose between concentrating his reconnaissance ﬂights on one route
or the other, and he actually took the northern option, whence his crushing victory.
Haywood argues for the rationality of both moves, including the Japanese one.
Having pointed out that the northern route was mistier than the southern one, he
computes the number of bombing days associated with each of the four possible
outcomes and solves the resulting 22 zero sum game using von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s solution. Here Min-Max reasoning on the two sides leads to an
outcome that ﬁt the facts, which confers some explanatory value on this reasoning.
The other application is the Avranches battle fought between US General Bradley
and the German general von Kluge in August 1944. Haywood analyzes it in terms of
a 32 matrix, which this time has no pure strategy solution. As he does not quantify
the payoffs, he cannot exhibit mixed strategies solutions, and this leaves one in doubt
about what he achieves in terms of explanation.14
Surprising though it seems, game theory rarely enters military studies as properly
deﬁned. Applications of a prescriptive or instrumental nature certainly exist, the
best-known being those pursued in the 1960s and 1970s for the RAND Corporation
and some US military agencies (see, e.g., Erickson 2015). But it seems as if the
historical part of military studies has no genuine game-theoretic application to offer
besides Haywood’s and the next case to be reviewed. This is not to say that scholars
in this area have no interest in history. To the contrary, there is a long tradition among
military strategists, which dates back to Jomini and Clausewitz, of basing their
thinking on a careful examination of past battles and campaigns. However, this
tradition is almost entirely narrative in the ordinary sense; so much so that it acted as
13Haywood has rather mysteriously disappeared from the academic scene, despite Brams’s (1975)
and Harrington’s (2009) supportive reviews of his contribution.
14At any rate, a later historical discovery showed that Bradley had in fact been cognizant of the
orders received by von Kluge, as the Allies had broken the German Enigma code (see Ravid 1990).
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a foil to the anti-narrative position epitomized by the Annales school historians in the
middle of twentieth century, notably Braudel (1969).15 By revisiting the Waterloo
campaign, Mongin (2008, 2018) attempts to show that it is possible to turn even a
worn-out example of military narrative into an AN.
Case 7 The Waterloo Campaign (Mongin 2008) As is well known, Napoleon’s
return to power in 1815 ended with his resounding defeat by Wellington and Blücher
on the battleﬁeld of Waterloo in Belgium. On June 16, the campaign began favorably
for him, with the French beating the Prussians at Ligny, near Charleroi. On June
17, Napoleon decided to send a large detachment under Marshal Grouchy against the
defeated Prussians, and he took the rest of his army to Waterloo, near Brussels,
where the English and Dutch were ready for a defensive battle. On June 18, the
French failed to break through the enemy lines and were eventually crushed when
the Prussians came as additional help. Despite innumerable histories, an explanatory
gap remains in this sequence: why did Napoleon decide to send out Grouchy’s
detachment? By doing so, he ran the risk of not having it on his side when he faced
Wellington, or, much worse, Wellington and Blücher together if they managed to
join forces, a possibility that effectively materialized.
To make progress with this explanatory question, Mongin proposes a zero-sum
game in normal form with two players, Napoleon and Blücher, allowing for uncer-
tainty in several ways. First, both Napoleon and Blücher are uncertain of which
battles will result from their independent decisions. Speciﬁcally, Napoleon can keep
his army united, dispatch Grouchy for a pursuit of Blücher, or dispatch it for
interposition between him and Wellington; and on his part, Blücher may either
retreat to Germany or try to join Wellington at Waterloo. This is nothing but standard
strategic uncertainty. However, a second form of uncertainty enters, since Napoleon
does not know Blücher’s type – here whether or not the latter was badly weakened
after Ligny – and this means that the game is one of incomplete information. Third,
external circumstances matter besides the players’ decisions, and both are ex ante
uncertain of the issue of each given battle. This is nonstrategic information, which is
treated here as if it were objective and amenable to common expected utility
calculations by Napoleon and Blücher.
Given suitable parameter restrictions, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Min-Max
solution delivers a unique equilibrium, which involves pure strategies. As in
Haywood’s example, this arguably delivers not only an equilibrium but also rational
choice recommendations. Napoleon should choose to dispatch Grouchy for interpo-
sition, and Blücher should try to join Wellington. That Napoleon effectively chose
interposition, rather than mere pursuit, can only be conjectured from the historical
record, but the game reinforces this hypothesis. The ex post failure is not an
objection since it could result from an unfavorable resolution of objective
15Clark (1985) conveniently summarizes the position taken by post-war Annales historians; see also
Stone’s (1979) critical discussion.
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uncertainty and from Grouchy misapprehending the plan – some historical evidence
points in these two directions. Overall, the study exempliﬁes how an analytic
narrative can be both formal and interpretive, since assumptions and conclusions
are assessed in terms of evidential reports that are always incomplete, equivocal,
and, given the high stakes, unavoidably biased. The conclusions adjudicate among
existing positions, indeed by reinforcing classic pro-Napoleonic arguments against
equally classic anti-Napoleonic ones.
Case 8 The CubanMissile Crisis (Various Authors) Few diplomatic events have
raised more scholarly interest than the crisis that took place from October 16 to
28, 1962, between the United States and the USSR. On 16 October 1962, President
Kennedy was shown U2 photographs demonstrating that the Soviet Union was
building missile bases in Cuba. Kennedy and his advisers pondered over several
options, which included doing nothing, making a diplomatic move, bombing the
missile sites, and blockading Cuba with the US Navy. Deliberation and further
investigation led to the blockade decision of 22 October. Khrushchev was notiﬁed
and the blockade was then publicly announced to the nation. In the ensuing days, the
crisis deepened, with some secret diplomacy nonetheless taking place. It was
eventually resolved on 28 October, when Kennedy and Khrushchev managed to
coordinate on a compromise solution. Essentially, in return for the USSR removing
its missile systems from Cuba, the United States would lift the blockade, pledge not
to invade Cuba, and – this was a later and secret part of the deal – remove missiles
from Turkey.
Innumerable accounts of this famous sequence have circulated, with the ﬂow
being sustained by the appearance of declassiﬁed secret material (see, e.g., Allison’s
1999 revision of his classic 1971 study). Among the accounts based on, or inspired
by, game theory, none seems to us sufﬁciently rich in narrative content to qualify as
an AN. Rather, they treat the Cuban Missile Crisis as a mere application of
theoretical ideas, and, if we include this topic here, this is because it offers a
touchstone of deterrence models, which recur in the AN literature. As Zagare
(2014) has explained, the game-theoretic literature on the Crisis has gone through
three essentially different stages. While the ﬁrst authors, like Schelling (1960),
gestured towards game theory rather than actually used it, a second wave from the
mid-1970s onwards exploited 22 normal form games such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Chicken, sometimes adding ingenious variations to them. A third
wave, which began in the mid-1980s, adopted extensive form games, whether of
complete or incomplete information, to analyze deterrence. Examples of the second
wave appear in Brams’s (1975) Game Theory and Politics, and at a more advanced
16In the latter work, Brams introduces a 22 game that schematizes the American and Soviet
choices (Blockade and Air Strike, Withdraw and Maintenance, respectively) and applies his “theory
of moves” to ﬁnd that the Compromise issue (Blockade, Withdraw) emerges as a “non-myopic”
equilibrium.
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level, in his Superpower Games (1985).16 For the third wave, which he associates
with a “sea change,” Zagare (2014) mentions an early model by Wagner (1989) and
his own “perfect deterrence theory” (as developed in Zagare and Kilgour 2000), both
of which involve extensive form games of incomplete information. This leads us
now to a speciﬁc examination of Zagare’s contributions to AN.
Case 9 The Moroccan Crisis of 1905–1906 (Zagare 2015) After they had
overcome their conﬂict over Sudan in 1898, France and Britain moved towards an
alliance that materialized in formal agreements in April 1904 (the so-called Entente
Cordiale agreements). The most important of them involved a trade of inﬂuences,
with France supporting Britain’s leading role in Egypt, and Britain supporting
France’s freedom of action in Morocco (with some role conferred on Spain in the
northern part). Having not been consulted at all over Morocco, and also responding
to the Sultan’s wish to counter France’s threatening inﬂuence on his country,
Germany championed its sovereignty and an “open door” policy for foreign trade
and investments. The German diplomatic pressures on the French government led in
1905 to the resignation of foreign minister Delcassé and the reluctant acceptance by
Président du Conseil Rouvier of an international conference. Ofﬁcially devoted to
the economic and administrative reforms that Morocco needed, the conference took
place from January to April 1906 in Algeciras. While Germany hoped to drive a
wedge into the Entente Cordiale and score a diplomatic victory over France, Britain
supported its ally and Germany ended up almost entirely isolated, getting only
limited concessions that would not sufﬁce to curb France’s colonial activism.
Zagare (2015) revisits the 1905–1906 events by appealing to the Tripartite Crisis
Game, which belongs to his more general “perfect deterrence theory”. This is an
extensive form game of incomplete information with three players acting sequen-
tially as follows. Challenger can either keep to the status quo or make a demand on
Protégé, who can either concede or hold ﬁrm, in which case Defender enters the
stage by either supporting or not supporting Protégé. If Defender has supported
Protégé, Challenger plays again by either backing down or accepting a conﬂict, and
if Defender has not supported Protégé, the latter plays again by either backing down
or realigning on Challenger’s side. Information is incomplete in that each player has
two possible types: Challenger may be “determined” or “hesitant,” Protégé “loyal”
or “disloyal,” and Defender “staunch” or “perﬁdious.” This ﬁgurative terminology
captures the fact that, for each nation player, some of its preferences over the
terminal nodes are unknown to the other two players. To deal with the 1905–1906
crisis, Zagare specializes the Triple Crisis Game by assuming that Challenger – here
Germany – is “determined”; this technically means that, at the last stage, Challenger
prefers to accept a conﬂict rather than to back down. Thus, incomplete information is
limited to Protégé and Defender – here France and Great Britain, respectively.
Technically, Protégé is “loyal” if, at the last stage, it prefers backing down to
realigning, and Defender is “staunch” if it prefers reaching the node where
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Challenger accepts the conﬂict to reaching the node where Protégé realigns. Fixing
initial probability values for Protégé being “loyal” and Defender being “staunch,”
Zagare shows how they get revised at the perfect Bayesian equilibria he computes. In
the Moroccan study as well as in other recent articles and in his 2011 book, Zagare
explicitly claims to be using the AN methodology.
Case 10 The July 1914 Crisis (Zagare 2011) The Games of July (2011) investi-
gates the diplomatic events that decisively contributed to the outbreak of World
War I, particularly emphasizing four historical turning points. The ﬁrst deals with a
remote but inﬂuential decision made by Bismarck in 1879 to offer a military alliance
to Austria, despite the tension this created with Russia, which was the main target of
this arrangement. The second relates to the unqualiﬁed support – or “blank check” –
Austria obtained from Germany in early July 1914 to crush Serbia, and the third to
the escalation of conﬂict with the other powers once Austria began taking action.
The fourth is devoted to the British decision to maintain an ambiguous policy during
the July crisis, a decision that may have misled Germany in believing in Britain’s
neutrality and thus may have contributed to the outbreak of the war. Each turning
point raises speciﬁc explanatory problems that a brief narrative and review of
historical literature helps locate. The book answers them through the instrumentality
of game-theoretic modeling, in accordance with a methodology that the author distils
in preliminary chapters and identiﬁes with that of AN (see also Zagare 2009).
Each case relies on a game of its own, although all are taken from the common
shelf of “perfect deterrence theory”. The ﬁrst, second, and fourth sequences are
handled by means of relevant variations of the Tripartite Crisis Game, and the third
by means of the Asymmetric Escalation Game, which also belongs to “perfect
deterrence theory.” We focus on the fourth case, which is concerned with British
policy, because this permits comparisons with the Moroccan case, in which this
policy had already played a crucial role. The Liberal Grey, who had succeeded the
Conservative Lansdowne at the Foreign Ofﬁce in the midst of the Moroccan crisis,
essentially pursued his predecessor’s policy of supporting France without making
any military commitment to it. The persisting problem for the British was to secure
peace on the continent by combining deterrence (of the Germans) and restraint
(of the French, especially in their support to the Russians), and this led them to
foster ambiguity on their ﬁnal intentions. Whether it was to the point to maintain this
carefully balanced policy in July 1914, as Grey did, is a major historical question. As
is well known, it eventually needed Germany’s invasion of Belgium on August 4 for
Great Britain to engage militarily on the side of France and Russia.
As in Case 9, the game-theoretic treatment proceeds from the Tripartite Crisis
Game. Germany, France, and Great Britain still occupy the roles of Challenger,
Protégé, and Defender, but this time Defender is “staunch” and Challenger may be
either “determined” or “hesitant” (the latter means that, at the last stage, Challenger
prefers to back down rather than to accept a conﬂict). As the “blank check” issued to
Austria was not known to the other players, endowing Germany with two types
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appropriately represents this uncertainty, but it is not obvious that the staunch type
describes how Britain was perceived in July 1914.17 However, interesting mixed
equilibria occur even under this limiting assumption, and they are consistent with
Grey’s “straddle strategy,” as Zagare (2011, p. 160) aptly designates it, thus provid-
ing the British diplomacy with a rationale (see also Zagare and Kilgour 2006). As
these equilibria seem compatible with the strategic situation more broadly, they
might serve to capture the protagonists’ effective interaction. Supposing they are
indeed the historically relevant ones, the war would have broken out not because of
Britain’s ambiguity, which had a serious intent even though it was a gamble, but
because in 1914, unlike in previous earlier crises such as the Moroccan one, the
gamble turned out badly.
We close this section with another case that does not belong to either military or
security studies but rather to historical political science. We include it here because it
involves an extensive form game of incomplete information and the use of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium as in Cases 9 and 10. The game belongs to the class of
deterrence models, which bridges the work in security studies with some of the
work in political science.
Case 11 (Nalepa 2010) During the transition from communism to democracy
experienced by eastern European countries, communist ofﬁcials had to choose,
roughly, between opposing the trend as much as they could and seeking a deal
with the democratic opposition. In this deal, they would retreat from power in return
for a promise that they would not later be banned from public functions. Nalepa
(2010) starts from the observation that, in some countries, the communists reached
such a compromise with the democrats and the democrats kept their promise (at least
by and large and for some period of time). This is puzzling because the democrats
had every reason to renege on the compromise. However, as the author argues, the
communists did have a way of avoiding this. The communist secret police had once
inﬁltrated opposition movements, so the democratic parties, which were heir to these
movements, were themselves in some danger of falling prey to a ban or similar
“transitional justice” measures. Only the communists knew the extent of the inﬁl-
tration, and this gave them an informational advantage over their opponents. An
explanation of the historical puzzle is forthcoming along these lines, and Nalepa,
who claims to be using the AN methodology, substantiates it by game-theoretic
modeling.
The ﬁrst model, which she attributes to Przeworski, is a perfect information
extensive form game in which the communists anticipate the democrats’ disavowal
and choose opposition rather than compromise. This model is of course a strawman,
17The assumption made regarding Britain’s type appears to be connected with a mathematical
difﬁculty. The Triple Crisis Game can currently be solved only in limiting cases. Concerning the
Moroccan crisis, the restriction was that Challenger was “determined,” and here it is that Britain is
“staunch” (Zagare 2015, p. 335, fn 7).
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since it never allows for the possibility of compromise. The second model, which is
Nalepa’s, introduces asymmetric uncertainty and comes close to a signaling game.
By assumption, the communists know exactly the percentage of inﬁltration among
democrats, who, being entirely ignorant, form a uniform probability on this param-
eter. If the communists choose to compromise rather than oppose, democrats read
this move as a signal that they are inﬁltrated to a signiﬁcant extent and revise their
probability accordingly. This informational exchange is captured in terms of the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, which we have already encountered in Cases
9 and 10. The study closes by comparing some of the available equilibria obtained
from this concept with historical situations. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, where the
communists opposed the democrats until they collapsed, compromises prevailed in
Poland and Hungary, and for relevant parameter values, there exist equilibria related
to these situations.
Analytic Narratives and Deductive Explanation
The studies covered in sections “The Five Studies of Analytic Narratives” and
“Analytic Narratives from Military and Security Studies” suggest some generaliza-
tions regarding the explanatory potential of AN. First, with the exception of Case 5,
which belongs to recent history, and Case 6, which similarly belonged to recent
history when it was written, they rely on an extensive scholarly record they use not
simply to determine the factual data but also to suggest problems to be solved. The
record is usually of the traditional narrative brand, and they identify the problems by
noticing explanatory gaps within it. For example, Case 1 revisits the alternation of
civil war and peace in Genoa with a view to explaining it, which had not really been
done before. Case 3 revisits the establishment of universal conscription with a view
of synthesizing explanations that hitherto had only been partial; and Case 7 revisits
the Waterloo campaign with a view to arbitrating a classic disagreement among
historians. Moreover, the problems appear to have been selected by carefully
considering what the importation of analytic tools could add to the more traditional
treatment. As Bates et al. (1998, p. 13) write, “our cases selected us, rather than
the other way around.” The only exception here appears to be Case 2, the topic of
which – the Ancien Régime ﬁnances in comparative perspective – is arguably too
wide for the analysis to get much grip on it. Mongin (2008, 2018) goes as far as to
claim that starting from the extant historical literature, deﬁning problems based on
the lacunas therein, and restricting the models to limited fragments of it are pre-
conditions for one’s adopting the AN methodology.
One may observe, however, that the problems are not exclusively of an explan-
atory nature.18 The Waterloo study aims not only at ranking competing explanations
but also at substituting some missing data – what instructions Napoleon gave to
Grouchy – with a deduction from the model. Here the gaps in the earlier narratives
18Discussions of AN rarely make this point; see, however, Downing (2000, p. 91).
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concern the facts of the matter, and not the explanation by itself. Less ambitiously
than this substitutive role, though, AN can orient factual research in novel directions,
as do other forms of problem-inspired history, like that promoted by the Annales
school. However, original scholarship has thus far been exceptional among AN
contributors, and they do not seem yet to have moved existing scholars towards
new agendas.
From the angle of the philosophy of explanation, AN seem naturally to connect
with the deductive scheme proposed by Hempel (1965), Nagel (1961), and many
others.19 Both the Analytic Narratives team and Zagare mention this well-known
scheme (though without detail).20 Broadly speaking, it postulates that to explain a
particular fact is to deduce the statement that the explanandum fact occurs from
statements that other facts occurred, along with statements of generalities so as to
effect a connection – these facts and generalities being offered as the explanans.
Besides requiring the logical correctness of the deduction, the scheme places epi-
stemic requirements on the constitutive statements, and philosophers of science have
dissenting formulations here. However, they all agree on the two basic points that the
explanandum statement must be known to be true and the explanans statements must
be, if not necessarily known to be true, at least empirically well supported. The rest
of this section discusses the extent to which AN explanations ﬁt with the deductive
scheme; we will exhibit signiﬁcant discrepancies, and thus prepare our ultimate
claim that narratives are an essential component of these explanations. This discus-
sion ﬁrst singles out the deductive requirement of the scheme (not to be confused
with the scheme itself) and then proceeds to the epistemic requirements that the
scheme also involves. Since we mean to follow the existing literature, we focus on
the use of game theory; but our conclusions can to a degree be generalized to the
other formal theories discussed in section “Some Deﬁning Characteristics of Ana-
lytic Narratives.”
If the deductive requirement is to apply to AN effectively, it needs to be adapted
to the distinction between statics and comparative statics that runs across them. One
may consider a game either speciﬁcally, i.e., for ﬁxed values of its parameters, or
generically, i.e., by not restricting the parameters or (more commonly) restricting
them minimally.21 Although not entirely sharp, this distinction points towards two
different possibilities for deduction. What can be deduced in the case of a speciﬁc
game is that given outcomes occur as equilibria of that game, and in the case of a
generic game, that different outcomes occur as equilibria when the instantiation of
that game changes with the parameter values. This is the statics versus comparative
statics distinction, as it emerges from the use of game theory.22 Correspondingly, one
may either explain a given historical fact by associating it with an equilibrium of a
speciﬁc game or explain a change in historical facts by associating it with a change in
19Useful critical summaries appear in Salmon (1992) and Bird (1998).
20See Bates et al. (1998, p. 12; 2000a, p. 697) and Zagare (2011, pp. 5–7).
21Game theory has another technical sense for the word “generic”; this will not be considered here.
22Other formal theories would specify the distinction somewhat differently.
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the equilibria of a generic game. Comparative static explanations are logically more
powerful than static explanations and should be preferred in principle. However, the
AN literature makes it plain that comparative static explanations are not easy to come
by. An exceptionally clear example appears with Zagare’s multiple versions of the
Triple Crisis Game, each of which is investigated in terms of comparative statics.23
Haywood’s simple analysis of two speciﬁc games represents the polar opposite case
of a merely static explanation. Although more sophisticated, Greif’s, Rosenthal’s,
and Mongin’s analyses fall more on the static side, since they let parameters vary
only in relation to given equilibria, so as to secure sufﬁcient conditions for the
existence of these equilibria, and they do not study the dependence of equilibria on
parameter values across the full range of possible values.
Having clariﬁed this preliminary distinction, we can explicate two difﬁculties AN
must face in seeking to satisfy the deductive requirement. The ﬁrst has to do with the
multiple equilibria occurring under most equilibrium concepts used by AN. When
the multiplicity occurs in a speciﬁc game or – for some ﬁxed values in the parameter
range – in a generic game, the game-theoretic assumptions do not sufﬁce for a
deﬁnite conclusion, and the deductive machine needs supplementing by some
external selection procedure. When the multiplicity occurs in a generic game simply
because the parameters change, the situation turns out for the better; now the
deductive machine works autonomously. Then the next step will be to compare the
equilibria and their underlying parameter values with the available historical evi-
dence. Contributors who claim that the deductive scheme is relevant to AN seem to
have this favorable case in mind.24
Second, there is the troubling problem of deciding what in the games plays the
role of the generalities that the explanans must contain if the deductive requirement
is to come into effect. In a static exercise, the natural candidate for this role is the
chosen equilibrium concept, e.g., subgame perfect equilibrium, the Min-Max solu-
tion, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In a comparative static exercise, it makes
sense to consider as generalities not only the equilibrium concept but also the generic
game (or, at a higher level, the class of generic games, the Triple Crisis Game being
such a class). So, we do ﬁnd general statements in AN explanations. However, they
are general only in the sense of being expressible as logically universal statements,
not necessarily in the deeper sense of being nomological, that is of counting as
putative laws of nature. Hempel’s (1965) paradigmatic version of the deductive
scheme proposes various conditions, besides the logical form, for a generality to be
nomological.25 The question arises whether the game-theoretic statements singled
out above meet these conditions, but we will not try to answer it here, being content
23On the deﬁnitions given above, the Triple Crisis Game is not a generic game, but rather a set of
such games. For instance, the specialized version for the Moroccan crisis is one such generic game,
and the specialized version for Grey politics is another.
24See Bates et al. (1998, p. 15) and Zagare (2011, p. 16).
25These and other conditions have been thoroughly discussed in the philosophy of science; see, e.g.,
Bird (1998, Chap. 1).
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with stressing its relevance. AN contributors who allude to Hempel (Zagare 2011,
approvingly; Bates et al. 1998, disapprovingly) do not seem to have gone far
into it. The common view among them is, more loosely, that the game-theoretic
pattern uncovered in one study can be transferred with some success to other studies.
Some go farther and claim to have at their disposal theories that apply across a
signiﬁcant range of historical states of affairs. This is the case with Greif (whose
“theory of endogenous institutional change” includes the Genoa study as a particular
application) and Zagare (whose “perfect deterrence theory” encompasses most of his
studies relative to World War I and, as he suggests, can also be applied to some
contemporary events).
We now consider how AN satisfy the epistemic requirements of the deductive
scheme of explanation. As noted above, AN typically draw their problems from the
extant historical literature and use little more than this corpus for checking their
solutions empirically. To pass this empirical test, they need to answer three questions
in the afﬁrmative. (i) Do the equilibria of the games approximate what historians
have observed concerning the explanandum? (ii) Do the game-theoretic assumptions
that constitute the explanans draw support from what historians have observed
concerning the circumstances of the explanandum? (iii) Is the explanans indepen-
dently supported, i.e., does it also draw support from what historians have observed
concerning other states of affairs than those under current investigation? We will
review these questions in turn.
Regarding (i), there appears to be a gap between Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 of section
“The Five Studies of Analytic Narratives,” and Cases 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of section
“Analytic Narratives from Military and Security Studies.” The explananda of the
second group are narrowly circumscribed in time and space, directly bear on
interactive decisions, and often if not always involve designated individuals, such
as Bradley, Napoleon, or Grey. By contrast, the explananda of the ﬁrst group extend
rather widely across time, space, or both, bear on institutional or organizational facts
rather than interactive decisions as such, and without exception involve collective
actors, such as clans, political elites, or regions. To be linked to game-theoretic
equilibria, the observable explananda of the ﬁrst group need to undergo a more
thorough abstraction process than those of the second group. This makes their
explanations prima facie more debatable than the others are. Pushing this line,
Mongin (2018) recommends applying the AN methodology preferentially to
explananda that share with military and security explananda the convenient prop-
erties of being spatiotemporally well deﬁned, and involving recognizable decisions
made by recognizable historical actors. However – as also pointed out by Mongin –
such recommendations threaten to trivialize AN. The explanations of the ﬁrst group
are more challenging than those of the second, which may remain too close to the
historians’ accounts to bring much illumination. It seems as if a balance needs to be
struck between the two dangers of arbitrariness and pedestrianism.
When it comes to (ii), the question of the identity of players arises again, and there
are now the further questions of endowing them with relevant strategy sets and
preference orders. AN keep the number of players to a bare minimum. This may be
easier to accept when players are hypothetical constructs, as in the ﬁrst group of
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studies, than when they are identiﬁable historical ﬁgures, as in some studies of the
second group. Indeed, somewhat shockingly, Grouchy does not enter the Waterloo
game, and the games for the July crisis never include all major powers together.26
Technical convenience explains these lacunas: thus reduced, the Waterloo game can
accommodate some informational complexity, and the July 1914 games can be
resolved despite their rich informational structure. For similar reasons, AN tend to
rely on rather small sets of pure strategies. To allow for mixed strategies enlarges the
players’ possibilities, but like much of game-theoretic economics, the AN literature
is reluctant to take this option; only Cases 9 and 10 make a signiﬁcant exception.
Historians will no doubt complain that the deﬁnition of both players and strategies in
AN impoverishes or distorts the historical evidence.
The deﬁnition of the players’ preferences is even more problematic. A modestly
sized set of strategies, and hence of outcomes, is already enough to turn preferences
into complex objects. Thus, podesteria with seven outcomes, and Triple Crisis with
six, induce 7! and 6! possible orderings, not small numbers. Moreover this compu-
tation assumes there are no indifferences. Zagare (2015, p. 332) contrasts two
inferential methods to deﬁne preferences sensibly: one can try to infer them either
from the historical actors’ observable choices or from plausible general assumptions
(such as the standard monotonicity and dominance assumptions of decision theory).
Preferences are said to be “revealed” in the former case (which is loosely reminiscent
of the revealed preference method in economics) and “posited” in the latter. We
understand these two ways as being complementary rather than exclusive. Observed
choices, even repeated under different historical circumstances, can hardly provide
enough data, since preferences typically make counterfactual comparisons, and
general assumptions are unlikely to be sufﬁcient either. Whatever the chosen balance
between “revealed” and “posited” preferences, historians will still no doubt com-
plain – this time, though, not by arguing that AN subtract too much from the
available evidence, but rather that they add too much to it.
Question (iii) plays an essential role in all formulations of the deductive scheme
of explanation. As Nagel (1961, pp. 43–43) writes, for instance, the point here is “to
eliminate explanations that are in a sense circular and therefore trivial because one or
more of the premises is established (and perhaps can be established) only by way of
the evidence used to establish the [explanandum statement].” To require that all
statements in an explanans be tested independently would be exacting, but even the
mild form of the requirement with “some” instead of “all” turns out to be challeng-
ing. Statements referring to historical particulars are the most recalcitrant, because of
the paucity of historical data. Thus, one of the games in Case 1 postulates that clans
strike a trade-off between the beneﬁts of gaining control of Genoa and the costs of
becoming responsible for its external security, but the sparse historical record does
not contain any independent evidence for this assumption.
26There were ﬁve at the time: Britain, France, Germany, Austria, and Russia. Zagare and Kilgour
(2006, p. 635) address this objection.
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Explanans statements that are akin to generalities have a better chance of being
tested independently. The Triple Crisis Game of Cases 9 and 10 illustrates this
possibility. It underlies the explanantia proposed for no less than four different
historical explananda (Germany’s choice of an alliance with Austria in 1878, its
diplomatic failure at Algeciras in 1906, its “blank check” to Austria in 1914, and
ﬁnally, Britain’s ambiguous policy in 1914). As Zagare and Kilgour (2000, 2003)
argue, what is central to the Triple Crisis Game is the assumption that Protégé can
realign with Challenger at the ﬁnal stage. Strategically, this gives Protégé leverage
over Defender while enlarging the room for maneuver of Challenger, and the Triple
Crisis Game thus acquires a ﬂexibility that makes it applicable across various historical
situations. This assumption constrains the four explanantia above and thus provides a
way of testing any of these individual explanantia by the empirical success or failure
of its neighbor. This establishes that Zagare’s explanations meet the independent
testability condition at least in part. However, one should of course not confuse
independent testability with successful independent testing. The central assumption
of the Triple Crisis Game runs into the historical problem that it applies more
convincingly to the 1878 and 1906 contexts, in which Protégé’s threat to realign
was plausible, than to the 1914 contexts, where this threat made limited sense.27
To sum up this section, we have borrowed the classic deductive scheme from the
philosophy of explanation and used it as a thread to investigate how AN contribute to
historical explanation. This scheme recommended itself because game theory has a
deductive machinery, and also because contributors to the ﬁeld of AN often lay claim
to it. We found that AN do not always involve proper deductions, and that they meet
the epistemic conditions of the deductive scheme only imperfectly. The next section
shows that the narrative component of AN can alleviate these failures. More
generally, it considers the role of this component in fuller detail.
The Role of Narration in Analytic Narratives
Consider ﬁrst the deductive failure connected with the multiplicity of equilibria.
Authors of AN are aware of this difﬁculty, and typically resolve it by appealing to
their narratives to decide among the possible equilibria.28 This sketch of an answer
needs to be reﬁned by distinguishing between different kinds of multiplicity, as we
did in section “Analytic Narratives and Deductive Explanation.” Suppose the author
of an AN wishes to devise an explanation in terms of some generic game. Narrative
information has already established what the explanandum consists of and is now
expected to say what parameter values of the generic game actually prevailed in the
27Zagare and Kilgour (2006) and Zagare (2011, pp. 161–162) show awareness of this problem.
Indeed, it would have been extraordinary if in July 1914 France had threatened Britain that it might
align with Germany.
28See Bates et al. (1998, p. 15): “Repeated games, for example, can yield a multiplicity of equilibria.
To explain why an outcome occurred rather than another, the theorist must ground his or her
explanation in empirical materials.” It is for “the narrative” to provide these “materials.”
24 P. Mongin
circumstances of the explanandum. If the generic game associates a unique equilib-
rium with these values, a dichotomy straightforwardly follows: either the equilib-
rium agrees with the explanandum, and the explanation can proceed further, or there
is no agreement, and the explanation has failed. Now consider the case in which the
generic game associates several equilibria with the historically relevant parameter
values, and exactly one of these equilibria agrees with the explanandum. It is not
clear whether one may still hope for an explanation. A standard move in applied
game-theoretic work, for instance in industrial organization, is to check whether the
unsuitable equilibria can be discarded on intuitive grounds. This informal procedure
has sometimes led to new developments in game theory. However, AN contributors
can regiment it less technically by letting the narrative speak. The pieces of narrative
information to use for the selection task may overlap, but should not be identical
with, those which have already served to determine the explanandum; otherwise, a
gross circularity would result.
The last move illustrates how the recourse to the narrative may complement an
imperfect deductive explanation. The selection it operates is conceptually different
from that which consists in ﬁxing parameter values. However, writers of AN are not
always clear about which kind of multiplicity, and hence which kind of selection,
they are concerned with. The reason for this seems to be that extensive form games
of incomplete information entered the ﬁeld only belatedly. Under complete and
otherwise perfect information, backward induction provides the extensive form
game with an essentially unique equilibrium once the parameters are ﬁxed. Under
incomplete, hence also imperfect information, backward induction is no longer
available, and subjective beliefs are part of the deﬁnition of equilibria, which tends
to make them non-unique even for ﬁxed parameter values. The Analytic Narratives
contributors were not yet in a position to clarify this necessary distinction, which, by
contrast, comes out well in the introductory comments to The Games of July.
Let us now return to the problem of preference assumptions. Although it
seems a good strategy to combine “revelation” (from choices) and “position”
(of commonsensical comparisons), this will not always be sufﬁcient to determine the
players’ preferences, and here again the narrative can help. For one thing, by granting
that the historical actors have some internal stability, it enlarges the set of choice data
on which “revelation” depends; for another, again granting stability, it offers a means
of cross-checking what “position” suggests. To illustrate, Napoleon’s preferences in
June 1815 cannot be guessed only from his choices at the time plus the trivial notion
that he preferred victory to defeat. His preferences included his risk attitudes, and to
assess the latter, it is best to adopt some temporal distance and remember that he had
been a bold and generally lucky gambler throughout his career. Thus, enlarging the
narrative beyond the initial scope limits the arbitrariness of the preference assumptions
in AN. This illustrates how the narrative can facilitate compliance with the deductive
scheme – this time, when an epistemic, not a logical requirement, is concerned.
Still in the epistemic sphere, consider the problem of independently testing a
generic game. One way AN contributors address this problem is by applying the
game to spatiotemporally disconnected historical states of affaires, so as to explain
them jointly. (This actually exceeds the usual demand for an independent test, which
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demands that one resort to control cases, but not to the point of devising a full-
ﬂedged explanation for these cases.) Besides Zagare’s repeated employment of the
Triple Crisis Game, we can exemplify the procedure with Nalepa’s generic game,
which she uses to account for three different democratic transitions (Case 11).
Interestingly, Nalepa (2010) reinforces her joint explanation by selecting new facts
from the narrative. She mentions that the communists began negotiating with the
democrats at an early stage in Poland and Hungary, and belatedly in Czechoslovakia.
This suggests that the communists believed in their bargaining power more strongly
in Poland and Hungary, a suggestion that connects with another fact of the matter:
they had inﬁltrated democrats more deeply in these two countries. Thus, the tempo-
ral pattern of negotiations indirectly supports the main explanatory point, which is
that the degree of inﬁltration was crucial to the communists’ success and failure in
defending their position. Revisiting the narrative with an eye on independent testing
has turned out to be productive.
Although it points in a clear direction, the previous analysis is not sufﬁciently
speciﬁc, because it does not make clear why it is narration, rather than any other way
of presenting historical evidence, that helps ﬁll explanatory gaps. This suggests a
more general question: why do AN contributors so strongly value this particular
mode of exposition? The primary reason seems to be that they are concerned with
interactions, whether directly or indirectly, and historical reports of actions typically
come under narrative guise.29 Now, it is still another question whether AN should
themselves preserve the form of their existing sources. Arguably, by doing so, they
are more objective than they would be if they reshaped these sources in non-narrative
form. Presumably, reshaping would sometimes add and sometimes suppress too
much information. Mongin (2008, 2018) illustrates this point with the sources on the
Waterloo campaign. They all consist of narratives, from the witnesses’ unelaborated
testimonies to the military strategists’ highbrow accounts, with a number of contex-
tual variations in between, such as those of popular military history. To summarize
this evidence in any other way than narration would distort it. Moreover, the problem
addressed in the Waterloo study precisely consists of a gap found in earlier narra-
tives, and a natural way to make this clear is to devise a summary narrative in which
the gap becomes shockingly visible.
Related to these points is the fact that the formal theories of rational choice have
privileged connections with the narrative mode of exposition. Models formulated
with these theories typically come with stories to make their technical points salient
or even simply intelligible. In the case of AN, these stories may or may not be
realistic to the point of mapping onto parts of a historical narrative. In section “Some
Deﬁning Characteristics of Analytic Narratives,” we argued that the actions in
extensive form games were idealizations of concrete actions. Although complete
similarity is beyond reach, the stories behind rational choice models, and in
29The novelist Philip Roth is said to have made this pronouncement: “Everything that matters
comes to us in the form of a narrative.” At least, every action that matters comes to us in this form.
30More on this in Grenier et al. (2001) and Mongin (2008).
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particular games, have sufﬁcient common ground with genuine histories for relevant
interchanges to take place between the two.30
There are many other reasons why it may be justiﬁed to value the narrative mode
of expression, but they are not speciﬁc to the methodology of AN and belong rather
to that of history in general, so we will not review them here.31 However, one of
these reasons deserves to be singled out. Philosophers of history often argue that
narratives, properly understood, encapsulate causal claims in their reports of tempo-
ral succession. Here is a famous didactic example: “The king died, and then the
queen died of grief.” Whether causal claims such as that made by this sentence are
satisfying from an explanatory viewpoint is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers,
like Danto (1985), think that narratives are explanatory by themselves, while others,
like Dray (1971), think that narratives are only occasionally so. An intermediary
position, which is probably White’s (1984, 1987), is that the causal content of a
narrative can always be extracted and subjected to separate scrutiny, so that the
narrative will or will not be explanatory, depending on how the examination of the
content turns out. This intermediary position seems promising for the methodology
of AN. By stressing the possibility of extraction, it opens the door to the modeling
stage of AN, and by making this extraction relative to causality, it reorients their
assessment from their deductive towards their causal performance, an enrichment of
the current discussion of AN.
We now complete our examination of the narrative component of AN by paying
special attention to their expository features; for the main, this is borrowed from
Mongin (2016). We will recognize three distinctive expository patterns for AN.
Case 1, concerning Genoa, follows a chronological order extending from the
consulate period, with its succession of civil peace and war under the consulate, to
prolonged civil peace under the podesteria.32 The exposition of the consulate
period follows a remarkable pattern. First, a standard narrative records the main
facts and introduces the explananda; then comes a game-theoretic model with
relevant variations, which suggests the explanans hypotheses; and ﬁnally a narra-
tive consolidates the explanation. Unlike the ﬁrst, this narrative borrows theoretical
terms from the modeling part, e.g., “mutual deterrence equilibrium,” and serves to
clarify and empirically support the explanans hypotheses, thus assuming the
function of problem-solver. Despite its special features, this is a narrative all
right, so we do have an alternation pattern. This pattern also appears, though a
little less transparently, in the rest of Case 1, as well as (albeit with some differ-
ences) in Cases 4 and 5.
31See in particular Roberts’s (2001) collection, with classic pieces by Dray, Mink, White, and others
and the 1985 collection of Danto’s works in the philosophy of history, Narration and Knowledge.
32One may note the dramatic quality of this sequence, which reminds one of the triadic plot structure
in many dramas or ﬁctional stories: an initially stable situation, a conﬂict between the characters,
and a positive or negative resolution of this conﬂict (see Freytag 1863, elaborating on Aristotle’s
Poetics).
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In Case 6, on Waterloo, the exposition begins with a campaign narrative in the
style of military history, which introduces the main facts and the (here unique)
explanandum. Then, a game-theoretic model delivers the explanatory hypothesis,
and a discussion follows that introduces more historical evidence. As a distinctive
feature, this study considers the initial narrative as being essentially satisfactory,
except for the explanatory gap it draws attention to. Thus, the model and its
discussion are parenthetical, and the initial narrative can be resumed once the gap
is ﬁlled. This pattern of local supplementation differs from alternation in being less
ambitious, since it does not involve creating a new narrative. However, the two
patterns locate the ﬁnal explanation in a narrative, and this feature is more important
than the difference between them.
Case 11, on “transitional justice,” goes through the following expository steps.
It introduces the historical problem of “transitional justice” in the early post-
communist years, puts forward a theoretical hypothesis both informally and for-
mally, proceeds to a narrative history of transitions, and ﬁnally compares facts from
this narrative with the theoretical hypothesis. Although well developed, the narrative
here is only a provider of data, and the whole study obeys a standard hypothesis-
testing scheme. What customizes it is that it gives a narrative form to its empirical
evidence. We will call this expository pattern analyzed narrative. Unlike in the ﬁrst
two patterns, it does not entrust the ﬁnal explanation to a narrative, whether ordinary
or revised, but rather states it abstractly and theoretically.33
Starting from this contrast, one may conceive of AN in two different ways. In a
restrictive view, they count as such only if they follow the alternation or local
supplementation patterns; in a liberal view, they may also follow the analyzed
narrative pattern. A reason for preferring the former is that it seems best to emphasize
what is most speciﬁc about AN; we have already used such an argument in section
“Some Deﬁning Characteristics of Analytic Narratives.” The thought-provoking
move is to make narratives analytic, and this necessitates the return of the narrative
at the end of the study. As they simply juxtapose the analytic and narrative compo-
nents, analyzed narratives are less novel. For two reasons, however, this argument
may be too stringent.
First, as we have mentioned, the three patterns share the feature of bringing in
historical evidence narratively, and this is by itself an important speciﬁcation, since
not every work in economic or political history does that. There have even been
voices in these ﬁelds, as well as in history more generally, calling for narration to be
33Crettez and Deloche’s (2018) treatment of Cesar’s death further illustrates the subgenre of
analyzed narratives. Following the general AN methodology, they carefully review the historical
evidence and extract from it a problem they solve with the aid of a formal model. How plausible is
the suggestion made by Suetonius and others that Cesar was aware of the plot to murder him when
he went to the Ides of March meeting of the Senate? The authors’ two-person game of normal form
has a single Nash equilibrium that is mixed, which in their view suggests a negative answer to this
question. Here the narrative provides both the evidence and the problem, but the solution is stated in
theoretical, non-narrative terms.
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downgraded, an attitude that conﬂicts with the way it enters analyzed narratives.
Well-known representatives of this anti-narrative stance are the members of the
Annales school, who championed “problem-oriented” against “narrative-oriented”
history, and the intransigent “new economic historians” whose ﬂags were economic
modeling and econometric techniques.34 One reason for preferring the liberal view
of AN is that they clearly illustrate the opposite stance of the “revival of narrative,”
to borrow a famous phrase by Stone (1979). Second, the beginning of this section
has pointed out several means by which narration can rescue ﬂimsy explanations,
and these means are also available in the third pattern. In particular, Case 11 selects
equilibria from narrative information in a manner no different from Cases 9 and 10.
In terms of the principles stated in the introduction, the third one, whereby the
narrative actively contributes to historical explanation, appears to be common to AN
broadly understood, although the alternation and local supplementation patterns
apply it more systematically and, as it were, more interestingly than the analyzed
narrative pattern does.
These reasons can tilt the balance in favor of the liberal view of AN, and we will
adopt this view here, thus completing our attempt at deﬁning the AN genre. To make
this deﬁnition more transparent, we may cite two groups of studies it does not cover.
(i) Some studies are concerned with speciﬁc historical events, involve a signiﬁcant
amount of narrative information, and base their explanations on the outcome of
complex interactions, but refrain from adopting a formalism and thus provide only
promising sketches of explanation. Besides Case 3, Myerson’s (2004) discussion of
the Weimar disaster is a good example – and all the more so given that his informal
comments are evidently made with a possible modeling in view.35 Works like these
are proto-analytic narratives. (ii) Other studies are also concerned with speciﬁc
historical events, base their explanations on the outcome of complex interactions,
and do develop these explanations by means of properly formalized models but do
not confer an explanatory function on the narrative, nor even prioritize it among the
sources of historical information. Two studies by Greif that antedate his adherence to
AN methodology can serve as examples. Greif (1993) investigates the community of
Maghribi Jewish traders who operated in maritime commerce in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, and Greif et al. (1994) investigate the connection between the
merchant guilds of medieval Europe and long-distance trade. These studies focus on
the commitment and coordination problems that traders faced in their dealings with
ofﬁcial rulers or other traders, and they use game-theoretic models to show that well-
34The ﬁrm contrast that Annales postulates between narrative- and problem-oriented history appears
among others in Furet (1981). The anti-narrative stand is also present among new economic
historians, e.g., Kousser (1984), who defends “quantitative social scientiﬁc history” against a
“revivalism” of narrative. Not every cliometrician has adopted this stance; witness the open attitude
of the editors of this Handbook.
35For instance, Myerson (2004) suggests treating the events of 1930–1933 in terms of a signaling
game between the Allies and the German conservative leaders. To get rid of the reparations burden,
the latter would try to impress the former by pushing forward Nazism as a political force
(a dangerous game if ever there was one).
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designed informal (in the Maghribi example) or formal (in the guild example)
institutions could overcome these problems. Their exposition mixes theoretical
elements with historical evidence, which is only occasionally narrative, in a dialogue
that clearly differs from the alternation pattern implemented in the Genoa case.
Despite their emphasis on interactions and game theory, which likens them to AN,
they are closer to other formalized works in historical political science or economics.
Let us designate them analytic non-narrative histories.36
Conclusion
This chapter has deﬁned AN in terms of three principles, the most intriguing of
which is that AN call upon a narrative also at the explanatory stage. We have pursued
our deﬁnitional investigation at the same time as making progress with the other
topic of the chapter, i.e., how AN contribute to historical explanation. In this latter
discussion, we have selected the deductive scheme of scientiﬁc explanation as a
benchmark: overall, analytic narratives exhibit more deviation from, than conformity
to, the deductive scheme, and this is precisely why they call upon the narrative for
help. A more complete account of their explanatory performance would have
clariﬁed the kind of causal connections they can hope to establish, and this would
have led us also to investigate the kind of counterfactual history they develop. The
necessary brevity and thematic unity of this chapter made it impractical to go in these
directions. Similarly, we refrained from explicitly deﬁning what a narrative consists
of. This would have required us to compare the narrative mode of discourse with the
other modes, such as exposition, argumentation, and description, which historians
also use, and thus to delve in the recent work of narratologists as well as the more
traditional concerns of rhetoricians and literature teachers.
Thus far, political scientists have paid more attention to AN than other social
scientists. This is easily explained by the fact that the two main currents that have
shaped the development of AN, i.e., the equilibrium approach to institutions and the
deterrence approach to national security, are primarily of concern in political science.
But these disciplinary associations are in part a matter of contingency, and it is
anyhow the case that “analytic narratives should have no boundaries with respect to
subject or evidence” (Bates et al. 2000b, p. 690). In particular, there is no reason why
AN could not also have a signiﬁcant place in economic history. What might restrict
their use therein is that they are concerned with ﬁne patterns of actions and events,
like the formal theories of rational choice they borrow from, and are thus unable to
handle long-term historical processes, such as Britain’s Industrial Revolution, or
large-scale sets of social and economic relations, such as slavery in nineteenth
century USA. But these wide topics are of course the bread and butter of today’s
economic historians; and if AN can teach them anything, it would be precisely by
directing their attention towards the fact that it is possible to approach some
36More examples could be found in Greif’s (2002) survey of game-theoretic economic history.
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microscopic structures no less rigorously than these topics, albeit by different formal
means.
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